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Trade Secret Piracy
Martin A. Levitin*
A RASH OF RECENT CASES of alleged piracy of trade secrets has
made headlines in trade publications, newspapers and
magazines. A sampling of recently decided and still pending
cases include the "Space Suit Case" in which the B. F. Goodrich
Company enjoined a former employee from divulging space suit
fabrication techniques and other trade secrets to a competitor;'
the Delaware case between two of the largest American chemical
companies to determine the merits of a suit to prevent the re-
vealing of trade secrets in a pigment manufacturing process; 2 the
multimillion dollar suits of large American drug manufacturers
against Italian drug manufacturers resulting from theft of anti-
biotic drug manufacturing processes;3 and the "pressurized shav-
ing soap case" in which damages totaling nearly $10 million were
awarded for misappropriation of trade secrets and patent in-
fringement. 4
What has provoked this apparently startling increase in ac-
tivity in the trade secret field, which has been a subject of liti-
gation for 500 years or more? 5 Formulas several generations old
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I B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N. E. 2d 99
(1963); 137 United States Patents Quarterly (U.S.P.Q.) 804 (1963) revers-
ing 137 U.S.P.Q. 389 (Ohio Com. Pls. 1963). Issues and facts in this case
are dramatically presented in Brooks, Annals of Business, New Yorker,
January 11, 1964, p. 37.
2 E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company v. American Potash and Chem-
ical Corporation, 200 A. 2d 428 (Del. 1964); Bowen, Who Owns What's in
Your Head?, Fortune, July 1964, p. 175; Dismissal Refused in Trade Secrets
Case, Chemical and Engineering News, May 11, 1964, p. 23; Legal Hurdle
for Job Hoppers, Business Week, June 1, 1963, p. 95.
3 Two Convicted in Merck Trade Secret Case, Chemical and Engineering
News, July 6, 1964, p. 28; Kobler, Who Stole the Formula?, Saturday Eve-
ning Post, June 29, 1963, p. 82; Piracy-A Rising Worry for U. S. Business,
U. S. News, September 3, 1962, p. 83; Daniel, Spies Invade Big Business,
Reader's Digest, January, 1962, p. 93.
4 Carter Products Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. C.
Md. 1963); Smith, Business Espionage, Fortune, May, 1956, p. 118.
5 Note, Trade Secrets, Customer Contracts and the Employer-Employee
Relationship, 37 Ind. L. J. 218 (1962); Prager, History, Background and
Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 309 (1961); Bar-
ton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. Cin. L. Rev. 507 (1939).
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for products such as Coca Cola, Chanel No. 5, Angostura Bitters
and Lea & Perrin's Worcestershire Sauce have for the most part
experienced little difficulty in protection of their secrets.6 But
these are the exception. The burgeoning American technology
since World War II has grown as the result of the competitive
pressures to develop technical innovations by research and de-
velopment expenditure in nearly every kind of manufacturing
business.
Research and development expenditure by government and
private industry has skyrocketed from $5.1 billion in 1952 to
$18.5 billion in 1962, with spending projections calling for $25
billion in the year 1970. 7 The stakes of the game having gone
up, many professional players from all over the world have been
attracted to it.
Attitudes toward trade secret pilfering vary to great ex-
tremes; as for example, in Japan there is no law protecting
against stealing of trade secrets and some premium has even
been put upon doing the job well." This may explain at least in
part why nearly four times as many patent applications are filed
in Japan as are filed in the U. S. where the current rate of filing
has declined to about 50,000 applications per year. International
markets for stolen industrial secrets have developed in Japan and
Switzerland and the great productivity of American research and
development has been a fertile field for marketable data.
Industrial espionage has thus become a subject of grave con-
cern to American business. This is evidenced by the attendance
of nearly 2500 people at the 1962 convention of the American
Society for Industrial Security.9 On the international scene, the
International Chamber of Commerce is investigating adoption of
uniform international laws to halt the stealing of trade secrets.
These proposed laws would make illegal the disclosure, trans-
mission or use of the trade secrets of another company. The
game of watching the competitor's progress from a distance has
taken on some new dimensions.10 The attitude expressed by
6 They've Got A Secret, Time, February 22, 1963, p. 87.
7 Industrial Spying Goes Big League, Business Week, October 6, 1962, p. 65.
8 School for Spies, Time, December 14, 1962, p. 82.
9 Cook, The Corrupt Society-Part VI, 196 Nation 474, 475 (1963).
10 Brenton, They Spy for Industry, Popular Mechanics, May, 1962, p. 102;
Jones, How the Auto Makers Spy on Each Other, Popular Science, Febru-
ary, 1958, p. 133; Gehman, Executive Spies, Cosmopolitan, February, 1958,
p. 70.
Jan., 1965
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss1/12
TRADE SECRET PIRACY
many that they would not hire a man who offered competitive
data for sale, since he might leave in a few months and go else-
where to sell, is undergoing some careful scrutiny. A study made
by a student group at the Harvard Business School reported an
astonishingly large use of competitive intelligence information
by business men in their decision-making processes."
A second contributing factor to the rise of litigation over
trade secrets is an apparent decline in the usefulness and impor-
tance of patents in the protection of the products of research and
development and a corresponding increase in the use of trade
secrets as an alternative to patents. The procedural difficulties
and the long delay and expense of obtaining patents outweigh in
many instances the dangers incurred by relying on trade secrets
for the protection of the competitively advantageous position.1 2
A third factor with possible impact on the situation is the
shortage of qualified technical personnel available for research
programs. This shortage, especially marked in connection with
skills needed in government-sponsored weapons programs, has
led to raiding of employee talent as contract awards shift from
company to company. 13 With this personnel movement comes
movement of ideas which might be considered by former em-
ployers to be protectable trade secrets.
Law of Trade Secrets14
Trade secrets may consist of formulas, patterns, devices or
compilations of information which are used in a business and
which enable it to obtain advantages over competitors who do
not know or use the secrets. Trade secrets need not be patent-
11 Alden, Business Intelligence, CI Associates, Watertown, Mass., 1959; Spy-
ing for Profit, Time, July 27, 1959, p. 59.
12 Herald, Trade Secrets as an Alternative to Patents, 9 Am. Law S. Rev.
1107 (1941); and see also Scherer, Patents and The Corporation (2nd ed.
1959).
13 Coleman and Sole, The Effect of Shifting Employment on Trade Secrets,
14 Business Lawyer 319 (1959).
14 See generally, Turner, Trade Secrets (1962); Ellis, Trade Secrets (1953);
Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade Marks, Chapter 10 (1929);
Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trademarks (2nd ed. 1950); Fox, The
Law of Master and Servant in Relation To Industrial and Intellectual Prop-
erty (1950); 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, Protection of Ideas, Sec. 32
(1958); 5 Williston, Contracts Sec. 1628 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1937); 56 C. J. S.
483, Trade Secrets, Sec. 72; 35 Am. Jur. 525, Master and Servant, Sec. 97;
Stohr, Trade Secrets in Processes and Machines, 8 St. Louis U. L. J. 117
(1963).
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able to warrant protection by courts of equity. The various con-
cepts used by the equity courts to justify protection of employers
from the wrongful compromise of their trade secrets are the
protection of a property right,15 implied contract (unjust enrich-
ment 16 and breach of confidence (fiduciary relationship) .17
Whatever the rationale for the court's decisions, it is a well set-
tled rule of law that an employee has an absolute obligation both
during and after his term of employment not to disclose to others
or use to his own advantage or to the detriment of his former
employer the trade secrets of his former employer.18 This is the
case whether or not a written agreement has been signed by the
employee.19
The Fine Line
Often in suits in equity, however, the tests are not as clear.
In a given case are there actually trade secrets warranting pro-
tection? Questions to be determined are the extent to which the
supposed trade secrets are known both outside the company and
within; how much effort and money was put into developing the
secret and guarding it after discovery; how valuable the secret
is to its owners and competitors; and how difficult it would be
15 B. F. Gladding & Co. v. Scientific Anglers, Inc., 245 F. 2d 722, 113
U.S.P.Q. 497 (6th Cir. 1957); Ferroline v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
207 F 2d. 912 (7th Cir., 1953). Also see Note, Equitable Protection of Trade
Secrets, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 164 (1923).
16 Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A. 2d 838
(1958), Note, Trade Secrets, 7 Kan. L. Rev. 222 (1958). Also see 43 A. L. R.
2d. 94, 185 (1955).
17 Opinion of the Comptroller General of the U. S., 136 U.S.P.Q. 321 (1963);
Hahn U. Clay v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 320 F. 2d 166, 138 U.S-P.Q. 369 (5th
Cir., 1963); Note, Obligation of a High-Level Employee to His Former Em-
ployer, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1962); Standard Brands Inc. v. U. S. Par-
tition Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 130 U.S.P.Q. 258 (E. D. Wisc., 1962).
18 Carter Products Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra n. 4. Also see gen-
erally, Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Ohio S. L. J. 5 (1962); Vitro Corp. of
America v. The Hall Chemical Co., 292 F. 2d 678, 131 U.S.P.Q. 90 (6th Cir.
1961); Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 Va. L. Rev. 583
(1961); Symposium, Intellectual Property, 9 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 1 (1960);
Gertner, Trade Secret Remedies, 3 Tr. Law Guide 29 (1959); Restatement(second); Agency § 396 (1958); Restatement, Torts § 757 (1939).
19 Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625(1960); McTiernan, Employees and Trade Secrets, 41 J.P.O.S. 820 (1959).
For an excellent presentation on restrictive covenants in employment con-
tracts see Yeager, Company Secrets Have Reasonable Protection, Nation's
Business, October, 1959, p. 14. Forms for employment contract clauses may
be found in Gordon, Employment and Agency Agreements (1940).
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for others to honestly acquire the information. 20 The burden of
proof is upon the complainant to show that his secret is truly of
value and importance, that he is the owner of it by right of dis-
covery, and that the secret was wrongfully appropriated by de-
fendant for his own or another's use.
The court in trade secrets cases is often faced with balanc-
ing the equities.
21
While it is required that equity should lend its aid to the
fullest extent to protect the property rights of employers,
considerations of public policy and justice demand that such
protection should not be carried to the extent of restricting
the earning capacity of individuals on the one side, while
tending to create or foster monopolies of industry on the
other.22
The point of balance lies somewhere between absolute protection
of the property right of the employer and the unrestrained right
of the employee to better himself by change of business affilia-
tion.
23
Other Interests
To the struggle between the old employer and his departed
employee or the new employer there has recently been added a
formidable party in interest. The United States Government by
reason of its enormous research and development expenditures
(probably greater than 60% of all such expenditures in recent
years) is now intimately involved directly and indirectly in many
trade secret altercations. Through a process facetiously called
"reverse engineering," the Government has been accused of us-
20 Maruchnics, Industrial Trade Secrets, Their Use and Protection, 4 Clev.-
Mar. L. Rev. 69 (1955).
21 Addante v. Cinelli, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
22 New Method Laundry v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 161 P. 990, 991 (1916);
See also McClain, Injunctive Relief Against Employees Using Confidential
Information, 23 Ky. L. J. 248 (1935).
23 Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn-Against
the Employer, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 38 (1953); See also Note, Trade Secrets, 74
Harv. L. Rev. 1473 (1961). Cases holding for the employee on various
grounds include: Gabriel Co. v. Talley Industries, 137 U.S.P.Q. 630 (D. C.
Ariz. 1963); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A. 2d 430 (1960);
Bryan v. Sid W. Richardson Inc., 254 F. 2d 191, 117 U.S.P.Q. 157 (5th Cir.
1958). Levine v. Johnson & Co. 107 Cal. App. 2d 322, 237 P. 2d 309 (1951).
Contra, B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, supra n. 1; Hahn & Clay v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., supra n. 16; Vitro Corp. of America v. The Hall Chemical Co.,
supra n. 17; Seismograph Service Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc. 135 F.
Supp. 342 (E. D. La. 1955), modified 263 F. 2d 5 (5th Cir. 1958).
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ing proprietary data furnished in proposals by one contractor
as a basis for requests for bids from other contractors, thereby
compromising the property of the first contractor. 24
In the backwash of the drug company cases a curious gov-
ernment position was shown.25 The Italian firms accused of buy-
ing stolen process data for the production of antibiotic drugs
have been supplying the United States Government with large
quantities of the drugs at lower prices than bid by American
companies. The response to complaints by the American drug
companies was an implied threat of investigation for price fixing.
It is no wonder that Merck president John Connor is somewhat
bitter in his statement on trade secret piracy.
Commercial espionage is a crime. It damages stockholders
of the company whose secrets have been stolen by depriving
them of their property. It damages the employees by keep-
ing the company from increasing employment and raising
wages. And it damages the public if the fruits of research
cannot be protected, the incentive to develop new products
and improve old ones is bound to suffer.26
In the "Space Suit Case," one of the questions posed was
whether confidential information acquired by B. F. Goodrich
Company in the performance of a Government research and de-
velopment contract and subsequently reported to the Govern-
ment remains confidential so far as a competitor is concerned
unless published or otherwise released by the Government. Al-
though the court failed to tackle this question directly, the an-
swer by reason of the decision would appear to be in the affirm-
ative.
27
Following the decision in B. F. Goodrich v. Wohigemuth, a
Pentagon counsel was quoted as expressing concern about the
growth of the trade secret spirit in industry. He likened it to a
return to the old guild system of doing business, a system which
was supposed to have been eliminated by the patent system.21
24 Harris, Trade Secrets as they Affect the Government, 18 Bus. Law. 613
(1963); Klein, Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle, 55 N. W. U. L. Rev. 437
(1960).
25 Supra, n. 3.
26 Daniel, op. cit. supra, n. 3.
27 B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, supra n. 1; Jeter, Trade Secrets-The
Space Suit Case, 18 Bus. Law. 695 (1963).
28 Back to the Guild?, Newsweek, June 3, 1963, p. 62.
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A National Aeronautics & Space Administration legal official
was also quoted as commenting that no information developed
by a company in the course of government work can be labeled
a trade secret.2 9 With this extreme position many would take
issue, and the legal periodicals have carried much of the de-
bate.30
Conclusion
In their handling of trade secret cases, courts should be
mindful of the dangers in either path they might follow. On the
one hand, they must take care that they do not make the discov-
eries of corporate research unprotectable and of insufficient
value to warrant further private research expenditure. 1 On the
other hand, they must take care not to bar engineers and scien-
tists from changing jobs, as a punishment for their own produc-
tivities and abilities-a modern form of intellectual involuntary
servitude.
29 Ibid.
30 Daddario, Effect of Government Patent Policy on Research and Develop-
ment, 45 J. P. 0. S. 663 (1963); Daddario, Patent Policy for a Free Enter-
prise Economy, 47 A. B. A. J. 671 (1961); Long, Government Patent Policy
to Serve the Public Interest, 47 A. B. A. J. 675 (1961); Geoffrey, Do the
Atomic Energy Act and the National Aeronautics and Space Act Promote
Adequate Space Advancements?, 43 J. P. 0. S. 624 (1961), Healey, Current
Controversy Over Patent Rights Under Government Research and Develop-
ment Contracts, 3 J. A. G. Bull. 3 (1961); Symposium on Government Con-
tract Patent Policy, 21 Fed. B. J. 3 (1961).
31 Typical opinions in the protection of employer interests in trade secrets
are the following:
For the entire course of appellant's conduct the law can offer nothing
but censure. Our civilization has passed beyond the era of cutthroat
competition. Not only do business men deprecate practices that deprive
one's neighbor of his rights, but the ethic that abounds among upright
men is to let rivals live and, if a competitor deserves success, so to act
as to defeat the piracy of such advantages as he may honorably acquire.
Wallich v. Koren, 181 P. 2d 682, 685 (Calif. 1947).
An employee has the right to take employment in a competitive busi-
ness and to use his knowledge (other than trade secrets) and experi-
ence, for the benefit of the new employer, but a public policy demands
commercial morality, and courts of equity are empowered to enforce it
by enjoining an improper disclosure of trade secrets known to the em-
ployee by virtue of his employment.
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, supra n. 1 at p. 500.
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